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Objectives: Examine how differences in state regulatory environments predict geographic disparities in the
utilization of cancer screening.
Data sources/setting: 100% Medicare fee-for-service population data from 2001-2005 was developed as multi-year
breast (BC) and colorectal cancer (CRC) screening utilization rates in each county in the US.
Study design: A comprehensive set of supply and demand predictors are used in a multilevel model of
county-level cancer screening utilization in the context of state regulatory markets. States dictate insurance
mandates/regulations and whether alternative providers (nurse practitioners) can provide preventive care services
supplied by MDs. Controlling statistically for the supply of both types of providers, we study the joint effects of two
private insurance regulations: one mandating that insureds with serious or chronic health conditions may receive
continuity of care from their established physician(s) after changing health insurance plans, and another mandating
that external grievance review is an option for all health plan coverage/denial decisions. These private insurance
plan regulations are expected to affect the degree of beneficial spillovers from managed care practices, which may
have increased area-wide cancer screening rates.
Principal findings: The two private insurance regulations under study were significant predictors impacted by local
market conditions. Managed care spillovers in local markets were significantly associated with higher BC screening
rates, but only in states lacking the two forms of regulation under study. Spillovers were significantly associated
with higher CRC cancer screening rates everywhere, but much higher in the unregulated states. Area poverty
dampened screening rates, but less so for CRC screening in the states with these regulations.
Conclusions: Two state insurance regulations that empowered consumers with more autonomy to make informed
utilization decisions varied across states, and exhibited significant associations with screening rates, which varied
with the degree of managed care penetration or poverty in the state’s counties. Beneficial spillover effects from
managed care practices and negative influences from area poverty are not uniform across the United States.
Both variables had stronger associations with CRC than BC screening utilization, as did state regulatory variables.
CRC screening by endoscopy was more subject to market and regulatory factors than BC screening.
Keywords: Insurance regulation; Managed care spillovers; Cancer screening; Geographic disparities;
Health insurance reform; Comprehensive cancer controlBackground
In the United States in 2009, breast cancer (BC) was the
most common cancer in women and colorectal cancer
(CRC) was the third most common cancer in both men
and women [1]. Today, these facts persist and now one
in four deaths in the United States is attributable to* Correspondence: lmobley@gsu.edu
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in any medium, provided the original work is pcancer [2]. Timely screening can detect or even help
prevent cancer, or catch it at earlier stages and improve
morbidity outcomes. Despite these benefits, the utilization
of breast and colorectal cancer screening is highly variable
across geography and population subgroups [3-7].
Numerous previous studies have examined impacts of
personal and environmental factors on the utilization of
cancer screening, but no studies have examined whether
macro-level factors, such as the states’ insurance regulatoryan Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
g/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
roperly credited.
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utilization. Also, it is not known whether state laws regard-
ing permitting nurse practitioners to practice or prescribe
drugs without physician oversight have impacted the
cancer screening utilization climate. The major objective of
this paper is to examine geographic disparities in the
utilization of cancer screening among the FFS Medicare
beneficiary population, and to assess whether or how dif-
ferences in state health insurance and nurse practitioner
regulatory environments may help to explain these dispar-
ities. We examine two state regulations that vary across the
states and are expected to be correlated with the pro-
pensity to utilize cancer screening services. We expect this
correlation to be stronger for CRC than for BC screening
utilization, because the former is more susceptible to influ-
ence from economic factors and consumer information
that can be impacted by the regulatory environment.
We adapt a conceptual model used in previous research
on incidence of late-stage cancer to describe the cancer
screening utilization climate [8]. We estimate an ecolo-
gical model, aggregating across individuals in their coun-
ties of residence to generate county-level compositional
factors reflecting the personal characteristics of the
Fee-for-Service (FFS) Medicare population such as age,
race or ethnicity, low income or disability status, distance
to closest provider, and recent experience moving to a new
residence. For the empirical models, we define these
compositional factors separately for women in the FFS
Medicare population 2003-2005, for use in the BC screen-
ing model. For the CRC model, the compositional variables
are defined for all FFS beneficiaries during 2001-2005a. In
both BC and CRC models, we include compositional fac-
tors and other county-level variables representing context-
ual factors related to both supply and demand. We have a
single cross section of 3,133 counties, to which we add a
second level to the model by including state-level factors
describing nurse practitioner laws, shortages of medical
doctors ( MDs), prevalence of MediGap insurance among
persons aged 65+, state insurance market competition, and
two insurance regulatory factors.
Conceptual model
The conceptual model (Figure 1) draws from the litera-
ture and describes spatial interaction among people and
characteristics of their contextual environments along
the pathways to health care utilization [8]. This hybrid
model incorporates the behavioral model of utilization
[9] and spatial interactions in health care access and
utilization [10]. The notion that interactions between
race and place may influence social outcomes is not new
[11], but other environmental interactions remain largely
unexplored, and the broader dimension of regional op-
portunities has largely been overlooked in literature to
date [12]. Our ecological conceptual model (Figure 1)makes explicit three levels of influence, including the
county, state, and larger regional-level factors.
Each U.S. state represents a unique health care envir-
onment with unique and decentralized cancer control
programs and state-specific insurance and practitioner
regulations. State health care environments are governed
by local and regional politics, health insurance regulation
and mandates, social systems, market-level forces that
determine provider and insurance supply factors, and
community- or neighborhood-level forces that deter-
mine social factors. Individuals exhibit predisposing,
enabling, and need characteristics, all of which interact
with the forces in the broader system and yield the eco-
logical screening rates and other compositional factors
that we observe for counties.
Previous studies have found significant positive effects
of participant enrollment in managed care on utilization
of BC screening [13,14], but no studies have found
greater utilization of endoscopic CRC screening among
managed care enrollees versus enrollees with other types
of insurance. In addition to these direct effects, there is
significant evidence of managed care spillovers onto other
market constituents. Spillover effects from managed care
have been defined and examined in the literature several
ways, including changes in practice patterns, costs, or the
diffusion of new technology relative to what might occur
in markets with little managed care influence [15-17].
The economic argument for managed care spillovers is
as follows. In urban areas where managed care is more
prevalent, managed care plans can impact the diffusion
of newer technology by directly impacting the decision
of whether to invest in newer technology, or dissemin-
ation of guidelines regarding for whom it is best indi-
cated. Managed care may also exert influence on
physicians, impacting the way that medicine is practiced
across all patients with a variety of insurance types.
Changes in managed care provider practice patterns can
spill over to people who are not insured by the managed
care plans, e.g. our FFS Medicare population, but who
are seen by the physicians who are affected by the infor-
mation or screening guidelines the plans disseminate.
Also, traditional FFS Medicare beneficiaries may compare
treatment options with and be influenced by the care
patterns received by their peers who are in Medicare man-
aged care plans. Managed care plans can disseminate
information and guidelines and promote preventive care
services in their markets, having an impact on the way
medicine is practiced or services are utilized in their mar-
kets. Managed care spillovers may impact adherence to
screening guidelines by market participants, whether or
not they are enrolled in managed care plans.
In our study, we have the opportunity to examine the
managed care spillovers across heterogeneous markets
where penetration rates vary considerably. Managed care
Figure 1 Socio-ecological model of breast and colorectal cancer screening utilization.
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in more rural areas where physicians are scarce, dis-
tances to providers are greater, and choices among
insurance plans are limited. One might expect that man-
aged care might have a greater impact on behavior in
these markets, where more encouragement or guidance
may be needed to convince seniors to utilize cancer
screening, partly because of greater obstacles regarding
access and information.
Studies find evidence suggesting that breast cancer
screening rates may be higher in regions with higher
managed care penetration in Medicare and the private
sector [18-20]. As regards CRC screening, researchers ex-
amined 1999 data covering the traditional FFS Medicare
population in the largest US counties and found evidence
of a positive national managed care spillover associated
with higher utilization of endoscopic CRC screening [21].
However, this national finding from 1999 data precedes
the Medicare coverage expansion to cover endoscopy for
CRC screening among persons of average risk. Another
study found that national managed care spillovers were
positively associated with CRC screening rates in some
markets, but negatively associated with CRC screening
rates in others [17]. A study that focused on endoscopy
utilization for CRC screening in individual states found
that managed care spillovers were significantly positive in
some states in the U.S., and negative in others [22]. Tosum up, the evidence regarding beneficial spillovers from
managed care penetration on BC screening is consistent,
however the evidence regarding spillovers on CRC screen-
ing varies across the United States, and is positive in one
national study using 1999 data aggregated across all states.
The study in this paper updates the data to include the
period directly following the Medicare coverage expansion
to cover endoscopy for CRC screening (2001-2005). The
statistical modeling estimates a national managed care
spillover effect on both BC and CRC screening, which is
modified by local state insurance regulations through a
cross-level interaction effect. This statistical approach
allows the national spillover estimate to vary with local
market conditions and both highlights and helps explain
the spatial heterogeneity that exists from state to state in
the US healthcare market.
Health market environmental factors
Health market environment effects include both the
impacts of insurance and practitioner regulations as well
as spillover effects from managed care plans onto all
market constituents. As regards nurse practitioners, the
availability and utilization of primary care providers may
affect the frequency of preventive cancer screenings. The
cost of obtaining any medical procedure includes direct
monetary costs, a function of individual insurance cover-
age, as well as indirect costs such as the travel time and
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vider. In areas with a greater availability of primary care,
the indirect costs of obtaining a cancer screening are
lower, potentially leading to more screenings per year.
While physicians have traditionally been the main pro-
viders of primary care services, nurse practitioners (NPs)
are increasingly important in this area. In 2010, there
were approximately 56,000 NPs providing primary care,
representing about twenty percent of all primary care
providers in the United States [23]. However, the preva-
lence of NPs varies widely across geography and with
state regulations regarding their practice latitude.
Each state determines the range of medical services an
NP can provide and the extent to which they can provide
these services independent of physician oversight. Some
states allow NPs to practice and prescribe independently
without physician involvement, while others allow NPs to
practice and prescribe only with physician collaboration
or supervision. Evidence suggests that when states allow
NPs to practice and prescribe independently, adults obtain
routine checkups at a higher frequency and have better
health outcomes [24]. Holding constant statistically the
availability of MDs, we would expect these laws to affect
breast and colorectal cancer screening if people in areas
with laws limiting NP practice have less access to primary
care, including preventive screening services. States with
relaxed scope-of-practice laws for NP practice might see
more cancer screenings performed as both physicians and
NPs can spend more time providing patient care than in
states with stricter laws.
Factors that may impact the probability of submitting
to cancer screening are: information about the procedure;
cost, both monetary (out of pocket copayments and
deductibles, transportation) and time (participatory and
travel); perceived risk from the procedure (minimal for
mammography or MRI, more substantial for sigmoidos-
copy and colonoscopy); and expected benefits from the
procedure (early detection, in situ removal of potentially
cancerous lesions). About 60% of seniors during this time
period were enrolled in MediGap supplemental plans [25]
which covered the out-of-pocket costs associated with en-
doscopy. All states (except Utah) mandated that insurers
cover the full cost of mammography during this time
period [26], so there were no out-of-pocket costs for the
majority of mammograms. The time costs are much lower
for mammography than endoscopy, because there is no
advance preparation for mammography while preparation
for endoscopy is a multi-day ordeal which includes fasting
and drinking an unpleasant mixture in order to thor-
oughly flush and cleanse the bowel. There is a small risk
of adverse effects to seniors from this bowel preparatory
routine, especially to diabetics and those with restricted
sodium intake or delicate electrolyte balances. There are
additional risks from being put to sleep for the procedureor from accidental perforation of the bowel, and this risk
is greater for colonoscopy than for the older endoscopy
procedure, sigmoidoscopy. Perforation of the bowel is
extremely serious and can be life-threatening. Seniors may
need substantial coaching and advising by health practi-
tioners to be willing to undergo endoscopy and then to
properly adhere to the requirements for successful im-
aging. Travel costs for mammography are also expected to
be lower than for endoscopy, simply because mam-
mography centers are much more prevalent than gastro-
enterology practices or clinics that perform endoscopy.
The state Comprehensive Cancer Control programs have
heavily promoted the use of mammography, and most
women view it as a necessary preventive health service.
Endoscopy services have not been promoted as exten-
sively, and guidelines in place at the time of this study
included a portfolio of several CRC tests, including the
fecal occult blood test (FOBT), which is a simpler examin-
ation of a stool sample. Because there are CRC screening
options and the endoscopy test is the most costly, a
greater amount of persuasion would be needed to encour-
age its utilization as compared to mammography, even if
the expected benefits were judged to be equal. All things
considered, we would expect area utilization rates of en-
doscopy for CRC screening to be influenced more strongly
by market and regulatory factors. Supply of practitioners,
distance to closest provider, managed care spillovers, and
state regulations on insurance and NPs are all expected to




The study population is the entire Medicare fee-for-
service (FFS) population aged 65 or older and residing in
the 50 U.S. states from 2001 through 2005. We used the
traditional definition of Medicare FFS coverage (persons
with both Parts A and B coverage). We defined a FFS
Medicare cohort of persons aged 65 or older in the
beginning of the study period and followed them for
several years to assess whether they used screening for
BC (in 2003–2005) or CRC (in 2001–2005). We used
annual data from 100 percent of Medicare claims to rec-
ord any mammography or endoscopy use by persons over
these intervals. Persons included in the cohort remained
alive, maintained coverage of Medicare Parts A and B, and
remained living in the same state during the entire period.
In the BC models we included only females, whereas in
CRC models we included both males and females. We
defined CRC screening as either sigmoidoscopy or
colonoscopy utilization, and defined BC screening as
either mammography or magnetic resonance imaging
(MRI) utilization. While MRI images of the breast can be
used for other purposes besides BC screening, we cannot
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avoid selection bias from dropping BC screening by MRI
for African American women with dense breasts, for
whom this BC screening procedure is recommended.
Although our study sample are FFS Medicare enrollees
who are not enrolled in managed care plans, we antici-
pated that the market environment that influenced their
utilization of preventive services would be impacted by
managed care spillovers, and state insurance regulations
designed to curb insurance practices that are viewed by
legislators as harmful to consumers.
Empirical specification and hypotheses to be tested
We used the conceptual model (Figure 1) to guide our
choice of covariates to include in the empirical model.
We chose a parsimonious set with low multicollinearity,
while covering all aspects in the conceptual model.
For example, it was not possible to include both
educational attainment and poverty, and the lack of
English language ability or percent uninsured were
also highly correlated with poverty. Compositional race or
ethnicity was also highly correlated with area race or
ethnicity.
The dependent variables, defined as the county level
screening rate for BC or CRC, were expressed as percent-
ages. For BC, this was the percentage of the FFS female
population who ever used mammography between
2003-2005. For CRC, this was the percentage of the
FFS population who ever used endoscopy (colonoscopy or
sigmoidoscopy) between 2001-2005.
For compositional variables, we included age groups,
with the youngest age group as the reference; race or
ethnicity, with whites as the reference; disability or dual
eligibility status (to reflect more vulnerable populations);
and degree to which the study population had recently
changed residence. The aggregate proportions at the
county level were expressed in units of percentages.
For contextual variables, we include the average dis-
tance to closest mammography or endoscopy provider;
managed care penetration; population in poverty; and
population density (defined as number of population per
1000 square miles to reflect urban extent). Managed care
penetration is defined as the percentage of the insured
county population enrolled in a managed care plan
(Source: InterStudy). Managed care penetration of the
private insurance market and poverty were expressed as
percentages. Tables 1 and 2 provide sample statistics for
the county-level compositional and contextual variables.
To characterize provider supply, we included the binary
indicator of whether the state allowed nurse practitioners
to practice independently and/or prescribe medicine as a
state-level policy variable, following Traczynski and
Udalova [24]b. We also included the state-level percentage
of counties with a MD shortage.To characterize insurance market conditions, we inclu-
ded the percentage of elderly persons with supplemental
MediGap insurance [25]. Supplemental insurance removes
out-of-pocket expenses, which can be considerable with
utilization of endoscopy, especially if there are complica-
tions or follow-on screenings, coded as diagnostic rather
than preventative and with much higher copays. We also
included insurance industry competition measured as the
market share held by the largest three private plans in the
state in 2001 [27].
For insurance regulatory effects, we chose two that
were expected to be especially pertinent for CRC screen-
ing by endoscopy, because of these several deterrents to
utilization that existed: it was an expensive procedure, it
had various guidelines in place for different screening
modalities, it posed some risk to the patient and was not
widely available everywhere, and it had a weak cost-
effectiveness basis at the time of our study. The two regu-
lations we study are 1) the external grievance review for
health plan coverage/denial decisions (R14) and 2) the
continuity of care mandate (R25) that allows enrollees
who change health insurance plans to continue to receive
care with established physicians who are not affiliated with
their new insurance plan at time of enrollment. The exter-
nal grievance review is expected to be important because
many insurers at this time promoted the use of a very
inexpensive stool test, which is useful in diagnosing the
likely presence of cancer, but not useful in a preventative
sense. (By contrast, suspicious lesions are removed during
endoscopy screening which helps prevent the develop-
ment of CRC). Also, once screened using endoscopy, if a
lesion was found and the patient was instructed to come
back for a follow-up endoscopy in the near future, this
was often coded as diagnostic and not well covered by
insurance. In addition, the required copayments for en-
doscopy varied widely across insurance plans during this
time. The continuity of care mandate is expected to be
important because having a relationship with an estab-
lished provider is expected to help inform the patient
regarding the importance of CRC screening, and also to
help the patient navigate the deterrent obstacles erected
by insurers who wish to avoid paying for endoscopy
claims.
Managed care is expected to have a greater role in
promoting cancer screening in markets where these two
insurance regulations do not exist, and where consumers
are more vulnerable to penurious insurance practices
and less information. There are several important differ-
ences across regulated and unregulated markets which
lead us to expect that the spillover effects from managed
care may be larger in the unregulated markets. States
enacting these laws had a greater managed care presence
at baseline, were more urban, and had more accessible
providers. The regulated states offer more consumer
Table 1 Descriptive statistics by county: mammography sample (female, 2003-2005)
Description Mean Std Dev Min Max
Percent of the FFS Medicare sample who used mammography services in 2003-2005 55.75 7.77 7.25 93.75
Percent of the FFS Medicare sample aged 75-84 30.97 3.41 0.00 43.85
Percent of the FFS Medicare sample aged 85+ 7.43 1.91 0.00 15.58
Percent of the FFS Medicare sample either with ESRD/disabled or having dual eligibility 21.14 11.07 0.00 85.88
Percent of the FFS Medicare sample who are white 86.5 12.5 2.9 100
Percent of the FFS Medicare sample who are Black 5.99 10.79 0.00 73.38
Percent of the FFS Medicare sample who are Hispanic 0.78 3.02 0.00 38.78
Percent of the FFS Medicare sample who are other races, non-white 6.70 6.57 0.00 97.06
Percent of the FFS Medicare sample who moved in 2003-2005 5.66 2.55 0.00 64.97
Averaged distance from FFS Medicare sample member residential ZIP codes to endoscopy
providers in 2003-2005 (miles)
13.83 21.67 0.03 587.43
Percent of county level penetration by all managed care plans in 2001 10.00 12.47 0.00 89.50
Population density (per square mile) 0.24 1.68 0.00 68.14
Percent of the county population in poverty in 2003 13.37 4.92 0.00 36.40
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covering costs of endoscopy, giving the consumer more
leverage in health insurance coverage decisions, and the
latitude to stick with established providers who can help
them navigate the insurance rules. In unregulated mar-
kets, managed care penetration was later and lower at
baseline, and there was a greater shortage of MDs, stricter
regulation of NP practices, greater market power con-
centration in the health insurance industry, lower popula-
tion density and higher distance to providers, and lower
utilization of endoscopy, among other things (Tables 3
and 4). We expect that manage care practices that pro-
mote use of preventive care services are more necessary in
these markets, and thus we would expect to see a largerTable 2 Descriptive statistics by county: endoscopy sample (m
Description
Percent of the FFS Medicare sample who used colonoscopy or sigmoidoscop
Percent of the FFS Medicare sample aged 75-84
Percent of the FFS Medicare sample aged 85+
Percent of the FFS Medicare sample either with ESRD/disabled or having dua
Percent of the FFS Medicare sample who are white
Percent of the FFS Medicare sample who are Black
Percent of the FFS Medicare sample who are Hispanic
Percent of the FFS Medicare sample who are other races, non-white
Percent of the FFS Medicare sample who moved in 2001-2005
Averaged distance from FFS Medicare sample member residential ZIP codes
2001-2005 (miles)
Percent of county level penetration by all managed care plans in 2001
Population density (per square mile)
Percent of the county population in poverty in 2003effect size on the spillover estimate in the unregulated mar-
kets. In unregulated markets, managed care is expected to
play a larger role in encouraging utilization because the
consumer protection regulations are absent, and because
markets are more sparse and transaction costs associated
with obtaining information or utilizing services is greater.
One hypothesis we can test directly is whether states
with NP regulations have higher or lower cancer screening
rates, or whether managed care spillovers or poverty ef-
fects exist for BC or CRC screening rates in counties.
Other hypotheses we test are whether states that have
adopted insurance regulations have higher or lower cancer
screening rates, or whether this depends on other factors
such as poverty or managed care penetration. We testale and female, 2001-2005)
Mean Std Dev Min Max
y screening in 2001-2005 36.92 6.17 14.90 66.67
33.23 3.42 12.77 48.08
6.70 1.68 0.00 14.77
l eligibility 20.03 10.51 0.00 84.21
91.5 12.5 3.6 100
5.98 10.81 0.00 74.95
0.92 3.46 0.00 43.54
1.57 6.50 0.00 96.36
9.30 6.23 0.00 98.64
to endoscopy providers in 10.2 18.1 0.07 473.64
10.00 12.47 0.00 89.50
0.24 1.66 0.00 67.11
13.73 5.77 0.00 43.50
Table 3 Sample statistics by county (N) by regime (REG1, REG2, REG3), mammography sample (female, 2003-2005)
REG11 R14 = 1 & R25 = 1
(N = 2,056)
REG21 R14 = 1 & R25 = 0
(N = 632)
REG31 R14 = 0 & R25 = 0
(N = 445) reference group
% Mammography screening in 2003-2005, among
FFS Medicare population
56.6 (7.5) 53.9 (7.6) 54.7 (8.5)
% Age 65-74 in FFS Medicare 61.3 (4.7) 63.1 (4.1) 60.8 (5.2)
% Age 75-84 in FFS Medicare 31.3 (3.4) 29.9 (3.1) 31.1 (3.6)
% Age 85+ in FFS Medicare 7.4 (1.8) 7.0 (1.8) 8.1 (2.3)
% Dual or ESRD in FFS Medicare 20.3 (10.0) 23.6 (11.7) 21.4 (14.1)
% White in FFS Medicare 87.9 (11.5) 83.1 (12.2) 85.2 (15.5)
% Black in FFS Medicare 5.2 (9.7) 7.2 (10.5) 8.0 (14.8)
% Hispanic in FFS Medicare 0.38 (1.5) 2.5 (5.8) 0.15 (0.4)
% Other race in FFS Medicare 6.6 (6.4) 7.1 (7.2) 6.6 (6.5)
% Mover in 2001-2005 in FFS Medicare 5.6 (2.6) 6.1 (2.3) 5.1 (2.3)
Average distance to closest provider 11.6 (23.1) 16.6 (18.5) 19.9 (17.1)
Managed care penetration, 2001 12.3 (13.3) 7.9 (10.8) 2.2 (4.3)
Managed care penetration, 1998 0.3 (2.1) 0.1 (0.3) 0.1 (0.1)
Population density in 2001 (in thousands) 12.6 (4.5) 15.2 (5.2) 14.1 (5.5)
% US population in poverty in 2001 47 62.5 25
% states allowing NP to practice and/or prescribe 11.8 (4.5) 15.0 (3.7) 18.1 (7.8)
% of counties with MD Shortage 63.9 (8.2) 56.9 (9.4) 65.3 (11.6)
% of Medicare population with Supplemental MediGap 63.1 64 78.5
1We defined three insurance regulatory ‘regimes’ based on the combination of the two state insurance regulatory variables (R14, external review and R25,
continuity of care.
Regime 1 (REG1) was defined as having both regulations in place (R14 = 1, R25 = 1). Regime 2 (REG2) was defined as having only one of these regulations in place
(R14 = 1). Regime 3 (REG3) included all other states, which had neither regulation. See Table 7 for Regime Membership by States.
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regulations and county-level managed care plan pene-
tration have had significant impacts on cancer screening
rates. This interaction allows the managed care spillover
estimate to vary with state regulatory conditions. We also
test whether cross-level interactions between state in-
surance regulations and county-level poverty rates have
significant associations with cancer screening rates. It is
widely known that screening rates are lower in more
impoverished communities. Whether the state regulations
aimed at helping protect consumers from the cost-man-
aging practices of insurers have different associations in
the poorest communities is investigated here.
Statistical analysis
We defined three insurance regulatory ‘regimes’ based
on the combination of the two state insurance regulatory
variables (R14, external review and R25, continuity of
care). Regime 1 (REG1) was defined as having both regu-
lations in place (R14 = 1, R25 = 1). Regime 2 (REG2) was
defined as having only one of these regulations in place
(R14 = 1). Regime 3 (REG3) included all other states,
which had neither regulation. These multistate regimes
could be considered a higher level in our model, however
we did not incorporate them as such statistically, becausetheir multilevel variance components terms were very
close to zero. The two-level model was estimated using
STATA XTMIXED [28] over 3133 counties in 49 states
(Hawaii is excluded due to lack of data).
We estimated multilevel models using data from
county and state levels after pooling the data across the
49 states. We fit random intercept models that allow
state intercepts to vary. To reduce collinearity, we exam-
ined only one cross-level interaction between the county
contextual and state regulation variable(s) per model.
For the first model (Table 5), we interacted managed
care penetration in the county with state-level regulatory
regime variables. For the second model (Table 6), we in-
cluded a cross-level interaction between the county pro-
portion of population living below the poverty level and
state regulatory regime variables. The estimation results
for these two models (along with their baseline non-
interacted models) are in Tables 5 and 6, respectively.
After estimation, we use the linear model with coefficient
estimates to derive the marginal effects of unit changes in
the managed care or poverty variables in each of the regu-
latory regimes, and report these at the bottom of the
tablesc. We present post-estimation linear combination
tests to assess statistical significance of these joint effect
estimates presented in the bottom of Tables 5 and 6.
Table 4 Sample statistics by county (N) by regime (REG1, REG2, REG3), endoscopy sample (male and female, 2001-2005)
REG11 R14 = 1 & R25 = 1
(N = 2,056)
REG21 R14 = 1 & R25 = 0
(N = 632)
REG31 R14 = 0 & R25 = 0
(N = 445) reference group
% Screening for colorectal cancer 2001-2005, among FFS
Medicare enrollees
37.8 (6.0) 35.5 (6.4) 34.8 (5.9)
% Age 65-74 in FFS Medicare 59.8 (4.6) 61.5 (4.1) 59.2 (5.0)
% Age 75-84 in FFS Medicare 33.5 (3.4) 32.2 (3.2) 33.5 (3.6)
% Age 85+ in FFS Medicare 6.7 (1.6) 6.4 (1.6) 7.3 (2.0)
% Dual or ESRD in FFS Medicare 19.3 (9.7) 22.3 (11.1) 20.1 (12.8)
% White in FFS Medicare 92.9 (11.5) 88.1 (12.6) 90.2 (15.4)
% Black in FFS Medicare 5.2 (9.7) 7.2 (10.4) 8.0 (14.9)
% Hispanic in FFS Medicare 0.4 (1.7) 3.0 (6.7) 0.2 (0.4)
% Other race in FFS Medicare 1.5 (6.3) 1.7 (7.3) 1.6 (6.1)
% Mover in 2001-2005 in FFS Medicare 9.0 (3.7) 11.2 (11.6) 8.2 (3.4)
Average distance to closest provider 8.8 (20.3) 11.9 (12.3) 14.2 (12.7)
managed care penetration, 2001 12.1 (12.5) 6.9 (9.6) 2.3 (4.1)
managed care penetration, 1998 13.6 (14.7) 8.5 (11.9) 3.4 (6.6)
Population density in 2001 (in thousands) 0.3 (2.0) 0.1 (0.3) 0.0 (0.1)
% US population in poverty in 2001 12.7 (5.3) 15.9 (6.1) 15.1 (6.4)
% states allowing NP to practice and/or prescribe 47 62.5 25
% of counties with MD Shortage 11.8 (4.5) 15.0 (3.7) 18.1 (7.8)
% of Medicare population with Supplemental MediGap 63.9 (8.2) 56.9 (9.4) 65.3 (11.6)
% Market Share Largest 3 Insurers in state, 2001 63.1 64 78.5
1We defined three insurance regulatory ‘regimes’ based on the combination of the two state insurance regulatory variables (R14, external review and R25,
continuity of care.
Regime 1 (REG1) was defined as having both regulations in place (R14 = 1, R25 = 1). Regime 2 (REG2) was defined as having only one of these regulations in place
(R14 = 1). Regime 3 (REG3) included all other states, which had neither regulation. See Table 7 for Regime Membership by States.
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and CRC models is
Yjk ¼ γ0 þ μ0k þ γ1Xj þ γ2Cj þ γ3Sk þ γ4Sk  Cj
þ ejkþηk;
Where Yjk is county-level screening rate in county j
and state k, γ0 is the overall intercept term for the 2-level
model, Xj represents all compositional factors, Cj repre-
sents the contextual factors, Sk represents the binary indi-
cators characterizing state insurance environments, ejk is
the residual of the outcome variable Yjk, and the μ0k are
the unique random intercepts for the state levels in the
model that deviate from the overall intercept γ0. The
residual ejk reflects within-state variation among counties,
including measurement error and variation that is not
explained by the model. The state intercept term is also
random and has an associated error term ηk, which re-
flects variation between states beyond what is explained
by the model. The variances of the two error terms are
estimated among other parameters from the data. One of
the main advantages of this empirical model is that the
standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity caused by
variability in the size of populations across counties.The multilevel modeling accounts explicitly for the
size of populations in states and stabilizes the variance for
those states with small populations, producing robust
estimates [29].
Results
Tables 1 and 2 provide sample statistics for the county-
level compositional and contextual variables. In Tables 3
and 4 we present sample statistics for the counties
grouped into the three regimes based on insurance regula-
tions: states with both mandates (REG1, 33 states and
2056 counties), with R14 only (REG2, 8 states and 632
counties), or no mandates (REG3, 8 states and 445 coun-
ties). Table 7 lists these three groups of states by state,
with their sample counts and percentage screening for BC
and CRC. It is apparent from Tables 3 and 4 that sample
populations in the regulated states (REG1, REG2) are
younger, more mobile, and their health markets are more
competitive as regards insurance choices and more con-
venient as regards mammography and endoscopy pro-
cedure locations, more urban, and with higher managed
care penetration than the unregulated states (REG3, 3rd
column). Average managed care penetration in 1998 and
in 2001 was higher in the regulated states than in the
Table 5 Ecological regression results, managed care interaction
BC screening, 2003-2005 CRC screening, 2001-2005
Base model Interactions Base model Interactions
Variable Coeff Pval Coeff Pval Coeff Pval Coeff Pval
% Age 75-84 in FFS Medicare -0.081 0.036 -0.081 0.035 0.010 0.773 0.009 0.785
% Age 85+ in FFS Medicare -0.299 0.000 -0.295 0.000 -0.462 0.000 -0.455 0.000
% Dual or ESRD in FFS Medicare -0.381 0.000 -0.383 0.000 -0.264 0.000 -0.266 0.000
% Black in FFS Medicare 0.107 0.000 0.107 0.000 0.076 0.000 0.076 0.000
% Hispanic in FFS Medicare 0.038 0.404 0.036 0.420 -0.016 0.624 -0.015 0.651
% Other race in FFS Medicare -0.151 0.000 -0.147 0.000 0.030 0.136 0.034 0.098
% Mover in 2001-2005 in FFS Medicare 0.177 0.000 0.175 0.000 0.062 0.000 0.062 0.000
Average distance to closest provider -0.035 0.000 -0.034 0.000 -0.040 0.000 -0.039 0.000
managed care penetration -0.016 0.131 0.190 0.005 0.033 0.000 0.217 0.000
Population density in 2001 (in thousands) -0.133 0.035 -0.133 0.034 0.100 0.054 0.099 0.055
% US population in poverty in 2001 -0.099 0.019 -0.092 0.029 -0.168 0.000 -0.161 0.000
% states allowing NP to practice and/or prescribe -0.109 0.935 -0.112 0.934 -0.996 0.276 -1.003 0.283
% of counties with MD Shortage -0.204 0.134 -0.202 0.140 0.075 0.422 0.076 0.423
% of Medicare population with Supplemental MediGap -0.088 0.230 -0.084 0.256 -0.019 0.703 -0.016 0.757
REG 1 (R14 = 1, R25 = 1)1 1.198 0.560 1.842 0.377 3.771 0.007 4.379 0.002
REG 2 (R14 = 1)1 1.358 0.578 2.024 0.415 2.370 0.155 2.824 0.102
Interaction REG1 with managed care penetration -0.210 0.002 -0.188 0.001
Interaction REG2 with managed care penetration -0.213 0.003 -0.180 0.002
Sum of direct and indirect tests BC Model CRC Model
Joint effect p-value Joint effect p-value
Effects of increasing managed care penetration in REG1 states vs Unregulated states -0.020 0.098 0.029 0.003
Effects of increasing managed care penetration in REG2 states vs Unregulated states -0.023 0.347 0.037 0.060
Effects of increasing managed care penetration in Unregulated states 0.190 0.005 0.217 0.000
1We defined three insurance regulatory ‘regimes’ based on the combination of the two state insurance regulatory variables (R14, external review and R25,
continuity of care).
Regime 1 (REG1) was defined as having both regulations in place (R14 = 1, R25 = 1). Regime 2 (REG2) was defined as having only one of these regulations in place
(R14 = 1). Regime 3 (REG3) was the reference group in the estimation; it included all other states, which had neither regulation. See Table 7 for Regime Membership
by States. Bold font indicates statistical significance at 95% confidence level.
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over 1998-2001 in all areas. Unregulated states also had
lower average endoscopy utilization, greater shortages of
MDs, stricter regulation of NP practices, more concen-
trated/less competitive health insurance markets, were
more rural, and had greater average distance to cancer
screening locations. Prevalence of supplemental MediGap
coverage was higher in the unregulated states.
In Tables 5 and 6, we provide the empirical results
from multilevel modeling of ecological factors at the
county level with state-level factors as higher levels of
influence. There was considerable variation across coun-
ties reflecting both socio-demographic and market-related
factors. Endoscopy services spread unevenly across Medi-
care markets during this period, resulting in some coun-
ties with no services requiring long travel distances to
reach the closest provider [17]. Average distance to closest
provider was a significant and negative predictor for bothtypes of screening. States varied widely in their regulation
of nurse practitioners, but these regulations had no signifi-
cant associations in our models. State-level MD shortage
and prevalence of supplemental MediGap insurance were
not statistically significant predictors. State insurance mar-
ket competition was statistically significant, but did not
change other effect estimates with the exception of popula-
tion density, which became insignificant when this insur-
ance competition variable was added to the model. Keeping
population density in the model is important, because man-
aged care penetration is higher in more urban markets and
we want to control for the urbanicity aspects. For parsi-
mony, we dropped the state insurance market competition
variable in the specification presented in Tables 5 and 6.
Penetration of managed care insurance and poverty
rates varied widely across the counties and states, which
empowers statistical tests of whether the prevalence of
managed care market spillover effects or poverty were
Table 6 Small-area regression results, poverty interaction
BC screening, 2003-2005 CRC screening, 2001-2005
Base model Interactions Base model Interactions
Variable Coeff Pval Coeff Pval Coeff Pval Coeff Pval
% Age 75-84 in FFS Medicare -0.081 0.036 -0.074 0.052 0.010 0.773 0.004 0.914
% Age 85+ in FFS Medicare -0.299 0.000 -0.299 0.000 -0.462 0.000 -0.470 0.000
% Dual or ESRD in FFS Medicare -0.381 0.000 -0.405 0.000 -0.264 0.000 -0.280 0.000
% Black in FFS Medicare 0.107 0.000 0.121 0.000 0.076 0.000 0.085 0.000
% Hispanic in FFS Medicare 0.038 0.404 0.028 0.556 -0.016 0.624 -0.044 0.204
% Other race in FFS Medicare -0.151 0.000 -0.109 0.000 0.030 0.136 0.053 0.012
% Mover in 2001-2005 in FFS Medicare 0.177 0.000 0.160 0.000 0.062 0.000 0.054 0.000
Average distance to closest provider -0.035 0.000 -0.036 0.000 -0.040 0.000 -0.040 0.000
Managed care penetration -0.016 0.131 -0.013 0.244 0.033 0.000 0.038 0.000
Population density in 2001 (in thousands) -0.133 0.035 -0.162 0.010 0.100 0.054 0.094 0.069
% US population in poverty in 2001 -0.099 0.019 -0.437 0.000 -0.168 0.000 -0.343 0.000
% states allowing NP to practice and/or prescribe -0.109 0.935 -0.432 0.749 -0.996 0.276 -1.181 0.216
% of counties with MD Shortage -0.204 0.134 -0.166 0.225 0.075 0.422 0.092 0.346
% of Medicare population with Supplemental MediGap -0.088 0.230 -0.083 0.260 -0.019 0.703 -0.015 0.774
REG 1 (R14 = 1, R25 = 1)1 1.198 0.560 -4.204 0.064 3.771 0.007 1.034 0.520
REG 2 (R14 = 1)1 1.358 0.578 -4.492 0.095 2.370 0.155 -1.753 0.360
Interaction REG1 with poverty 0.434 0.000 0.207 0.000
Interaction REG2 with poverty 0.442 0.000 0.297 0.000
Sum of direct and indirect tests BC Model CRC Model
Joint effect p-value Joint effect p-value
Effects of increasing poverty in REG1 states vs Unregulated states -0.003 0.959 -0.136 0.000
Effects of increasing poverty in REG2 states vs Unregulated states 0.005 0.939 -0.046 0.293
Effects of increasing poverty in Unregulated states -0.437 0.000 -0.343 0.000
1We defined three insurance regulatory ‘regimes’ based on the combination of the two state insurance regulatory variables (R14, external review and R25,
continuity of care).
Regime 1 (REG1) was defined as having both regulations in place (R14 = 1, R25 = 1). Regime 2 (REG2) was defined as having only one of these regulations in
place (R14 = 1). Regime 3 (REG3) was the reference group in the estimation; it included all other states, which had neither regulation. See Table 7 for Regime
Membership by States. Bold font indicates statistical significance at 95% confidence level.
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http://www.healtheconomicsreview.com/content/4/1/13associated with higher or lower utilization of cancer
screening, and whether these associations varied across
states with different insurance regulatory regimes. In
Tables 5 and 6, the column labeled “base model” reports
effect estimates when no interaction terms are included
in the model. The column labeled “interactions” reports
the effect estimates when interaction terms are included
in the model. In models with no interaction effects in-
cluded, the state regulatory variables are only statistically
significant predictors for CRC screening, where the rate
is about 3.77 percent higher in states with both regulations
(REG1) relative to unregulated states (REG3). County pov-
erty rate is a significant negative predictor, and the effect
size is almost twice as large for CRC as for BC screening.
Managed care spillover effects are not significant for BC
screening utilization rates, but they are significant and
positive for CRC screening rates in counties. This positive
national effect estimate is consistent with the previousstudy which estimated it for a more dated FFS Medicare
population [21]. State NP regulations are not significant
predictors in these models.
In models with interaction effects, the assessment of
statistical associations is done using combined direct
and indirect effect estimates, along with joint tests of
their significance. At the bottom of Table 5, we report
the change in BC or CRC screening rates for a unit
(percent) increase in the managed care penetration
rate in the different regulatory regimes, and provide a
joint test of the statistical significance of each scenario. At
the bottom of Table 6, we report the change in BC or
CRC screening rates for a unit (percent) increase in the
poverty rate in the different regulatory regimes, and
provide a joint test of the statistical significance of
each scenario.
In the interaction models presented in Table 5, we
found that managed care spillovers were significant and
Table 7 Sample statistics by state and regime
State name Mammography screening cohort Colorectal screening cohort
N % Screening N % Screening
Total all groups 12,691,175 58.0 17,249,117 40.1
Total Group 1, REG1: (R14 = 1, R25 = 1), 33 states 9,784,064 58.0 13,279,641 40.5
Alaska 15,220 56.2 22,585 37.9
Arizona 169,155 62.5 223,305 39.6
Arkansas 165,838 54.8 224,275 35.4
California 880,322 57.3 1,126,335 38.2
Colorado 119,296 58.7 156,466 39.7
Delaware 46,003 63 64,072 48.4
Florida 858,753 64.2 1,139,258 46.3
Illinois 612,065 55 818,437 37.8
Indiana 337,409 55.8 471,278 37.9
Iowa 190,402 59.6 274,939 39.5
Kansas 152,815 61 211,602 39.2
Kentucky 222,701 55.2 307,484 38
Louisiana 188,609 56.8 244,130 37.6
Maine 84,136 66.9 121,387 43.1
Maryland 248,969 58.9 346,573 44.8
Massachusetts 286,348 62.2 362,711 40.4
Michigan 556,834 62.6 765,461 43.1
Minnesota 214,559 63.1 314,019 43.9
Missouri 283,628 55.6 387,278 39.3
New Hampshire 67,023 63.5 95,298 41.4
New Jersey 434,880 50.9 567,836 39.6
New York 753,806 55.3 1,040,451 40.3
North Carolina 430,080 60.4 587,505 42.6
Oklahoma 179,423 54.5 248,870 35.9
Oregon 108,850 61.9 151,816 37.8
Pennsylvania 601,984 55.1 819,431 38.1
Rhode Island 37,545 58.6 50,326 41.7
South Carolina 223,371 60.1 308,796 42.5
Tennessee 286,680 55.2 395,590 38.1
Vermont 35,362 61.8 50,631 40.4
Virginia 352,984 57.4 492,814 42.4
Washington 229,864 61.6 314,345 41
West Virginia 114,593 58 162,307 36.8
Wisconsin 294,557 60 412,030 42.3
Total Group 2, REG2: (R14 = 1, R25 = 0), 8 states 2,184,838 57.2 2,961,963 39.1
Connecticut 195,009 60.9 245,186 42.7
Georgia 345,422 58.3 464,828 40.6
Hawaii 39,234 56.9 56,573 39.6
Montana 53,457 62.1 79,539 39.8
New Mexico 69,558 54.1 100,328 34.2
Ohio 568,259 58.4 783,948 39.3
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Table 7 Sample statistics by state and regime (Continued)
Texas 836,386 54.8 1,118,495 37.6
Utah 77,513 57.6 113,066 41.8
Total Group 3, REG3: (R14 = 0, R25 = 0), 8 states 722,273 57.2 1,007,513 37.8
Alabama 234,244 59.3 319,335 39.2
Idaho 57,586 56.6 82,703 36.7
Mississippi 156,305 51.3 211,398 36.4
Nebraska 100,748 56.6 146,001 36.1
Nevada 56,113 56.7 75,709 35.6
North Dakota 42,275 64.1 62,867 41.5
South Dakota 49,723 62 72,116 40
Wyoming 25,279 57.7 37,384 35.3
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http://www.healtheconomicsreview.com/content/4/1/13positively associated with BC screening rates, but only in
the unregulated states. In the unregulated states, a 1%
increase in managed care penetration would be associ-
ated with about a 0.19% increase in county BC screening
rate. Managed care spillovers were significant and positive
for CRC cancer screening rates everywhere, but much lar-
ger in the unregulated states. In the most heavily regulated
states (REG1), a 1% increase in managed care penetration
was associated with 0.03% increase in county CRC rates,
while in the unregulated states the association was about
0.22% higher screening rate. For the groups of states with
only one regulation (REG2), the effect seems a little larger
but is only weakly significant (p-val 0.06).
In the interaction models presented in Table 6, we
found that area poverty rates were significant and nega-
tively associated with BC screening rates, but only in the
unregulated states. In the unregulated states, a 1% higher
poverty rate was associated with about a 0.44% increase
in county BC screening rate. For CRC screening, poverty
associations were negative everywhere but the dampening
effect of poverty on screening was higher in the unregu-
lated states. For example, a 1% higher poverty rate in the
most regulated states (REG1) was associated with only
about 0.14% lower screening, while in unregulated states
(REG3) it was about 0.34% lower screening rate. These
differences across the most regulated (REG1) and unregu-
lated (REG3) states were highly significant.
Discussion
There are dozens of state insurance regulations aimed at
curbing insurance practices that were considered by
legislators to be harmful to consumers, that emerged
during the latter nineties when there was a general
backlash against managed care [26,30,31]. We initially
considered ten regulations that have been studied in pre-
vious literature that examined economic outcomes such
as increases in premiums and reductions in affordability
of insurance and higher rates of uninsurance [31-34].These studies examined health plan liability laws and
direct access to specialist mandates [31]; community
rating, any willing provider, and guaranteed issue laws
[35]; community rating by health status or age, and high
risk pools [32]; and external grievance review for health
plan coverage decisions [25]. While these economic out-
comes are important, no studies have examined whether
state-level variation in health insurance regulatory envi-
ronments have impacted aggregate health prevention
behaviors, a perspective that is critically important as
our nation grapples with healthcare reforms [36]. The
continuity of care law was found influential in the only
health outcomes study to date in this literature, which
looked at late-stage CRC cancer outcomes [8].
We chose to examine two regulations that were ex-
pected to be especially important for preventive care
services utilization outcomes. These are the external griev-
ance review for health plan coverage/denial decisions
(R14) and the continuity of care mandate (R25) that allows
enrollees who change insurance plans to continue to re-
ceive care with established physicians who are not affili-
ated with their new insurance plan at time of enrollment.
We expected both of these regulations to be significant
predictors because they both empower consumers to con-
test coverage denial decisions by insurers or higher copays
for some services as compared to others, and enable better
informed decisions by uniting consumers with their estab-
lished physician to help in making these choices and
demands. Both of these regulations proved to be significant
predictors in the models, and interacted significantly with
local area conditions such as poverty or managed care pene-
tration to predict area screening rates. The regulatory effects
were stronger for the riskier, more expensive and more con-
troversial CRC screening by endoscopy than for BC screen-
ing by mammography. This finding lends credence to our
theory that these regulations empowered consumers to
make more autonomous, better informed decisions re-
garding utilization of insured preventive care services.
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to promote cancer screening directly among enrollees and
indirectly as national spillover effects in more penetrated
markets, an interesting question is whether these benefi-
cial managed care spillovers are smaller or larger in the
dozens of states that have enacted regulations of private
insurance practices. Our theory is that health insurance
regulations that impact the ability of consumers to choose
particular services have downstream impacts on utiliza-
tion of preventive services in the market. The role that
managed care plans play in shaping market outcomes
stems from their dissemination of practice guidelines and
protocols, which help shape the way that medicine is prac-
ticed and which services are offered in their markets. We
find a small national spillover for endoscopy utilization in
the non-interacted models which restrict it to be the same
everywhere, consisted with an earlier study published
using older FFS Medicare data [21]. However, as suggested
by other studies [17,22], the magnitude of these managed
care spillovers was expected to vary across states. We
tested whether these spillovers varied across the regulated
versus the unregulated states, holding constant statistically
other market factors that varied considerably across these
groups of states. We found that managed care spillovers
were significantly higher in the unregulated markets. An-
other hypothesis we tested through the interactions was
whether the negative impact of poverty varied across the
regulated and unregulated states. We expected that this
negative association would diminish in regulated versus
unregulated states, if these regulations benefited poorer
constituents. We found statistically significant evidence
that the negative impact of poverty was lower in the regu-
lated versus the unregulated states.
Conclusions
Observed geographic disparities in breast and colorectal
cancer screening rates reflect ecological differences in
compositional, contextual, and regulatory factors among
health markets. State regulations which curbed nurse
practitioner services were not a significant predictor in
either of the cancer screening utilization models. However,
two state insurance regulations that empowered con-
sumers with more autonomy to make informed utilization
decisions exhibited significant associations with screening
rates, which varied with the degree of managed care pene-
tration or poverty in the state’s counties.
Managed care penetration has been historically slower
and lower in more rural areas where physicians are
scarce and distances to providers are greater. We expected
that managed care might have a greater association
with utilization behavior in these more rural, emerging
managed care markets, where more encouragement or
guidance may be needed to convince seniors to utilize
cancer screening, partly because of greater obstaclesregarding access. These more rural conditions are preva-
lent in states where the two regulations we study do not
exist to help seniors navigate or counter the reluctance of
providers to cover or promote expensive new screening
technologies. In these more rural, unregulated states, the
role of managed care spillovers encouraging screening
utilization was expected to be greater, and we found evi-
dence to support this expectation. In unregulated markets,
we found that the managed care spillovers were greater
than in the regulated markets, and that these associa-
tions were stronger for CRC than for BC screening. CRC
screening by endoscopy is the more expensive, controver-
sial screening modality so this finding is not surprising.
Encouragement to utilize endoscopy for CRC screening
needs to overcome transaction costs associated with both
time and distance, lack of information, uncertainties re-
garding risk from the procedure, and complicated screen-
ing guidelines and reimbursement schedules.
The cross-level interactions between managed care
spillovers and regulations were small in comparison to
the cross-level interactions of state regulatory regimes
with poverty. We find that poverty dampens screening
rates less in the regulated states than in the unregulated
states, ceteris paribus. Thus the regulated states seem to
have poorer communities that are better informed,
empowered, or better motivated to utilize CRC screening
than their counterparts in unregulated states.
Finally, our findings suggest that during this time
period, utilization of endosopy services for CRC screening
was more subject to influence by market factors than
utilization of mammography for BC screening. Compared
to mammography, endoscopy posed greater risk, is more
unpleasant, required copayment of substantial out-of-
pocket costs, and was often denied coverage for repeat
tests recommended by physicians as follow-up proce-
dures. Thus it is not surprising that we find that the influ-
ence of both area poverty and managed care spillovers on
cancer screening rates is more substantial for CRC screen-
ing by endoscopy than for the simpler, less expensive and
less controversial BC screening.
Endnotes
aThe period of study, 2001-2005, is rather dated. How-
ever, this study is unique and was only possible with
financial support from the National Institutes of Health.
At the time the study began, obtaining 100% abstracts of
FFS Medicare claims, to include all breast and colorectal
cancer screening utilization events for five consecutive
years, was financially feasible. Now, the cost of these
data is about five times higher and it is much more diffi-
cult to obtain permission for researchers to access 100%
of the Medicare claims extracts. Because these data are
based on 100% FFS Medicare population data, they are
perfectly generalizable for the vast majority of elderly
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They do provide a useful snapshot for market-driven
health systems of the impact of insurance and other reg-
ulations on an important preventive health outcome –
cancer screening. Thus, the data used here may be
dated, but they are uniquely valuable, and we will share
them with other researchers at no cost.
bFollowing Traczynski and Udalova (2013), we define
NP independent practice authority as the absence of
statutory or regulatory requirements for physician col-
laboration, delegation, direction, or supervision. Inde-
pendent prescriptive authority is defined as the ability
of NPs to prescribe medications (including controlled
substances, if allowed) independent of physician collabor-
ation, delegation, direction, or supervision.
cTo see how the marginal effects are calculated for the
different regime interaction terms, suppose
Y ¼ …þ γ2Cþ γ3S1 þ γ4S2 þ γ5S1  Cþ γ5S1  C ::::
Where:
Y is screening rate in county
C is managed care penetration
S1 = 1 when REG1 = 1, otherwise zero
S2 = 1 when REG2 = 1, otherwise zero
S3 = 1 is the omitted reference regime, when S1 = 0 and
S2 = 0
Then:
∂Y/∂C = γ2 + γ3, when S1 = 1
∂Y/∂C = γ2 + γ4, when S2 = 1
∂Y/∂C = γ2, when S1 = 0 and S2 = 0
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